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CHAPTERl 
Introduction: 
The Politics of Recognition 
and Response 
Eric Tucker 
On the morning of February 1, 2003 seven astronauts died when the space shuttle 
Columbia broke up in the sky high over Texas and Louisiana while reentering the 
earth's atmosphere. The event was immediately characterized as a disaster and the 
media interrupted its normal broadcasts to focus on the developing story. Within 
hours an independent review board was convened, headed by retired Admiral 
Harold W. Gehman Jr. (Broder with Oppel Jr. 2003). Almost unnoted in the 
ensuing discussions, and certainly of no great significance to commentators, was 
that these seven astronauts were also workers killed in the course of performing 
their jobs: six were members of the military (five American and one Israeli) and 
one a civilian employee of NASA (Shuttle Victims 2003). 
At first glance, this characterization of the event and the reaction to it seems 
quite natural. Public attention is focused on manned-space missions, which are 
presented as and perceived to be dramatic instances of heroic risk-taking in the 
name of advancing the.boundaries of human knowledge. Thus when missions fail 
so spectacularly and publicly, killing all those aboard, it seems intuitively obvious 
that we have witnessed a disaster. A noble pursuit has ended tragically in the loss 
of life. Jn that context, the status of the astronauts as workers, either military or 
civilian, is of no obvious public consequence because we are given to understand 
that they were voluntary risk takers: that is why they are celebrated as heroes, not 
mourned as victims. Thus, according to the New York Times' editorial writers, 
"They accepted the risks, the ones they knew and perhaps even the ones they 
couldn't have imagined. Their acceptance was unsentimental, just part of the job" 
(Remembering the Columbia Crew 2003). Moreover, we are also assured that 
the exposure of these workers to the risk of death and their voluntary acceptance 
of that risk is consistent with NASA's overarching commitment to safety. On 
the one hand, NASA proclaims that "[e]xploration involves risk, including the 
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risk of failure" but, on the other that, "[b ]eing an Agency workforce willing to 
accept risk, but only in an informed manner, is consistent with our unwillingness to 
compromise the safety and health of people and property or do harm to the 
environment" (NASA 1999). Although we are not told exactly how NASA's 
willingness to accept the risk of failure that can materialize in multiple deaths 
is consistent with an unwillingness to compromise health and safety, such state-
ments seem to be sufficient to satisfy the government and the public. Perhaps 
for this reason, there was almost no public outrage over the deaths at the moment 
they occmTed: everything humanly possible had .been done to ensure the safety 
of the astronauts, but something unforeseeably went wrong. But because the 
commitment to safety is genuinely felt, and because it is socially unacceptable to 
operate a space program whose risks materialize in multiple and highly visible 
deaths such as these, it also seems natural that an inquiry should be conducted to 
detennine what went wrong so that more deaths may be avoided in the future. 
As much as the public perception of and reaction to this working disaster 
seems natural, upon closer examination competing causal stories (Stone 1989) 
may begin to emerge that offer different constructions of the events and their 
meanings. For example, NASA's critics question the scientific utility of manned 
missions, taking the view that their primary purpose is to generate public support 
for an expensive space exploration program that provides little civilian benefit 
(e.g., Kuttner 2003). Viewed this way, the space shuttle program is not a noble 
endeavor but rather a spectacle, mounted by NASA and promoted by the cheer-
leading media, that diverts the public from insisting that government address 
pressing problems here on Earth. If that is so, are the inherent risks to human life 
associated with manned spaceflight worthwhile? As well, the supposed unstinting 
commitment of the program to safety may be more myth than reality. According to 
one journalistic account produced in the days following the loss of the Columbia, 
although there was a renewed emphasis on safety backed by increased funding 
immediately after the Challenger disaster of 1986, "NASA's pursuit of a safer 
shuttle has largely stalled. It is a story of seesawing budgets, political infighting 
and radical policy shifts against a backdrop of falling public interest in space 
exploration" (Barstow and Moss 2003). The Columbia Accident Investigation 
Board (2003, p. 187) adopted much the saµie view of NASA's safety program. 
"Despite periodic attempts to emphasize safety, NASA's frequent reorganizations 
in the drive to become more efficient reduced the budget for safety, sending 
employees conflicting messages and creating conditions more conducive to the 
development of a conventional bureaucracy than to the maintenance of a safety-
conscious research-and-development organization." From this perspective, the 
status of the astronauts as workers may not be so insignificant. NASA, it seems, 
behaved much like other employers: faced with a conflict between production 
and safety, they stinted on safety to achieve production targets. Perhaps these 
astronauts did not truly accept the risks to which they were exposed, including 
"the risks they could not have imagined" (whatever that means) in that, like other 
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workers, they put too niuch faith in the commitment and competence of the 
organization to which they provided service to provide them in turn with the 
safest possible working conditions. 
It is unlikely that the above reconstruction of the story will change anyone's 
view that the death of the seven Columbia astronauts was a disaster-although 
it may be viewed as a disaster of a different kind than initially thought-but 
hopefully it raises questions about the naturalness of the category and the 
meanings attached to it. For example, if it were revealed that tens of workers were 
killed and thousands injured or made ill in the course of designing, building, and 
maintaining the shuttle, the rockets, and the rest of the infrastructure supporting a 
manned space program, would that be construed as a disaster? What are the social 
processes that lead to the attribution of some events as disasters but not others? 
Why, for example, do we focus on single incidents in which there are multiple 
worker deaths and virtually ignore the far greater toll of death, injury, and disease 
that workers suffer one by one on a daily b~sis? 
The events surrounding the deaths of the Columbia astronauts and the 
Challenger astronauts before them also amply demonstrate that the character-
ization of an event as a disaster may imbue it with enormous emotional, social, 
and political power. A disaster may cause people to question assumptions that 
allowed them to accept with more or less equanimity the conduct of risky activity. 
It may trigger inquiries into the social utility of the objectives for which the risk 
is undertaken, or at least a reassessment of whether the benefits justify the risks. 
The social construction of an event as a disaster may also lead to an examination 
of the distribution of risks and benefits: for whose benefit are workers dying or 
being injured? It may produce inquiries into the adequacy of the systems of 
risk prevention and risk regulation that were supposed to protect workers: was 
the risk detected?; if not, why not?; if so, what was the response and why did it 
fail to prevent the risk from materializing in deaths and injuries? 
Just as we need to interrogate the social processes of disaster recognition and 
the attribution of meanings to that designation, so too we need to investigate more 
deeply the social, political, and legal processes that determine how the state 
responds to such events. Will the disaster designation change the balance of 
social forces so that groups previously unable to effectively assert their concerns 
in the policy arena may now have their voices heard and even heeded? Will 
the processes of re-examination result in significant and meaningful changes 
to public or private systems of risk regulation, or will the momentum for change 
be dissipated through processes that lead to a restoration or relegitimation of 
the status quo ante? 
The politics of recognition and response to working disasters are the subject 
of the essays gathered in this book. Although there are published case studies of 
the struggle for recognition of occupational disease (e.g., Clark 1997; Levenstein, 
Delaurier, with Dunn 2002; Rosner and Markowitz 1991) and of the aftermath 
of occupational health and safety (OHS) disasters (e.g., Cherniak 1986), the 
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subject of working disasters as a general phenomenon has not received sustained 
attention. One reason for this is that the topic intersects a number of different 
intellectual streams that are not commonly joined, and so it will be useful at the 
outset to briefly identify them. 
Disaster research is a relatively new field that has been dated back to a study 
by Prince (1920) of the Halifax Harbour explosion of 1917. It was not until the end 
ofWorld War II, however, that the field began to develop a distinctive analytical or 
research paradigm. To a great extent, this paradigm was shaped by the profes-
sional commitments of the authors in the fi~ld who were largely concerned 
with the management of the aftermaths of natural disasters such as earthquakes, 
floods, and hurricanes. Coming from this orientation, Charles Fritz (1961) pro-
vided one of the first definitions of disaster as: 
... an event, concentrated in time and space, in which a society, or a rela-
tively self-sufficient subdivision of society undergoes severe danger and 
incurs losses to its members and ·physical appurtenances that the social 
structure is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of the essential 
functions of the society is prevented. (p. 655) 
This definition, which focuses on time, space, and severity, continues to inform 
much of the literature in the field (e.g., Fischer 1998, pp. 2-3) and coincided 
precisely with those events that goverrunents defined as disasters justifying extra-
ordinary interventions. The ideal-type disaster, so to speak, was a sudden, natural 
occurrence that severely affected a discrete community. 
This definition did not exclude social factors from an analysis of disasters, 
but it also did not make them central. 1 Later researchers addressed this deficiency. 
Yet while they emphasized that the vulnerability of a community to harm from a 
natural event like a hurricane was a contingent social condition, not a natural state 
of affairs, this did not change their understanding of what constituted a disaster 
(Gilbert 1998). 
The study of socially or technically caused (as opposed to natural) disasters 
developed later. Barry Turner's seminal book, Man-made Disasters (1978), set the 
tone for much of the research that followed. He focused primarily on disaster 
causation, arguing that disasters largely stemmed from an accumulation of errors 
resulting from misinterpretation, false assumptions, poor communication, cultural 
lag, and misplaced optimism (p. 395). While others have criticized Turner's 
model and advanced alternatives (e.g., Perrow 1984; Vaughan 1996) their focus 
remained on events that fit Fritz's definition. For example, Turner's study was 
based on detailed analysis of 84 official reports of inquiries into single-incident 
events that produced multiple deaths; Perrow's focused on nuclear accidents; and 
Vaughan's on the launch of the shuttle Challenger. However, the approach to 
disaster causation taken by these studies laid the groundwork for undercutting 
the definitional certainty of their object. This was because in different ways 
these analysts theorized disasters not as the outcome of technological failures 
.. 
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alone, but rather as a result of the interaction between technology and organi-
zational, political, and economic contexts. Technological or man-made disasters, 
then, were not caused by single incidents and the harm they produced was not 
necessarily experienced immediately. · 
While these authors were not led to problematize the object of their study, 
others were beginning to question the concept of disaster itself, as they recog-
nized that at some level disasters were socially constructed phenomena (e.g., 
Quarantelli 1985). This approach received an additional boost in 1980s and 
90s from writers in the rapidly expanding field of risk studies. Lupton ( 1999, ch. 2) 
traced three epistemological positions in the risk literature: realist, weak con-
structionist, and strong constructionist. Realists treat risk as objective, measur-
able, and independent of social and cultural processes, but recognize that these 
processes may distort risk perception and assessment. Weak constructionists 
recognize the material reality of risk, but see its perception and assessment as 
inevitably mediated by social processes. Finally, strong constructionists see risk 
itself as a social construction. 
Strong constructionism has attracted few adherents among those writing 
in the field of disaster studies; if only because, as Oliver-Smith (2002, p. 39) 
notes, "the physical reality of disaster explicitly challenges theoretical currents 
that hold that nature is a purely social construction at the ontological level." 
Assuming broad agreement with the view that it is unproductive to sever the 
ties between disaster and material reality, however, still leaves unanswered the 
question of how social constructionism operates to select some set of harm-
causing events as disasters while ignoring others. 
Kreps (1998) attempted to reformulate Fritz's definition in a way that incor-
porated social constructionist perspectives. He defined disasters as: 
nonroutine events in societies or their larger subsystems (e.g., regions, 
communities) that involve social disruption and physical harm. Among, the 
key defining properties of such events are ( l) length of forewarning, (2) 
magnitude ofimpact, (3) scope ofimpact, and ( 4) duration of impact. (p. 34) 
While Kreps recognized that "precise thresholds of when historical happenings 
are socially defined as disasters have never been determined," his attempt to 
impose a threshold limited to "nonroutine" events seems artificial unless the 
goal of the exercise is to affirm the existing selection practices of state disaster 
relief agencies. By definitional fiat, this precludes so-called "routine" events 
that cause enormous harm on an ongoing basis from being constructed as disasters, 
thereby contributing to a process that normalizes both the occurrence of that 
harm and the state practices that permit it. 
A more promising model that focuses on the process of social construction is 
that of Robert Gephart Jr. (1984). His political sensemaking model joins, perhaps 
somewhat oddly, a post-modernist sensibility with a political economy 
perspective. According to Gephart, social reality is constructed by individuals 
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through the process of reflecting on and interpreting the meaning of phenomena. 
However, the process ofsensemaking is fundamentally political because divergent 
social interests, motives, and knowledge generate competing descriptions of 
reality. As a result, those who are more powerful are better able to have their 
versions of reality become the dominant one. In contemporary society, capital is 
better organized and mobilized to make its interests appear as the general interest, 
leading to the widespread acceptance of its constrnction of reality. The logic of 
Gephart' s analysis lends itself to radical critique of conventional understandings 
of disaster: 
The occurrence of a disaster is a political accomplishment. . . . Industry/ 
govemment makes claims minimizing the disruptive impact or nature of 
events .... Public critics make claims maximizing the disruptive impact or 
nature of events. {Gephart 1984, pp. 214, 218) 
Gephart's approach, however, does not seem to have attracted much attention 
among disaster researchers.2 
Although social constructionist approaches have led to a broadening of the 
scope of disaster research, it still has not reached into the workplace. Perhaps 
for this reason, occupational health and safety researchers have not drawn on the 
sociology of disaster literature in their studies of the processes of recognition/ 
non-recognition of working disasters. Indeed, to a great extent OHS researchers 
have not been concerned with the labeling of the harms that workers experience 
as disasters because the workers they are studying are confronting the logically 
prior problem of just getting employers and state officials to recognize that their 
work environment is causing harm (e.g., Levenstein et al. 2002; Markowitz and 
Rosner 2002). Much of the research into harm recognition is informed by a 
social constructionist perspective, although not in its strong forms, if only because 
the materiality of workplace hazards and banns seems all too apparent, even if 
only retrospectively. However, it is widely accepted that the recognition and 
assessment of risk is a social process that takes place against a backdrop of 
often conflicting objectives among workers and employers, and in a world in 
which scientific knowledge and research, and political, administrative, and legal 
decision-making do not escape the effect of unequal power relations. Recog-
nition of OHS hazards is thus an intensely political process. Thus for example, 
Levenstein et al. (2002, pp. 4-7) theorize that workers' OHS concerns get recog-
nized when unions are in a position to challenge the power of employers (rarely) 
or when progressive forces, including occupational health researchers, coalesce to 
form a strong alliance in support of reforms, and some employers find it in their 
interest to accept that existing practices need amelioration. Numerous studies 
(Clark 1997; Derickson 1998; Levenstein et al. 2002; Markowitz and Rosner 
2002; Rosner and Markowitz 1991) have amply documented the shocking role of 
industry, often assisted by doctors and scientists, in suppressing available hazard 
information and in blocking further research. 
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The essays in this collection that address the politics of recognition, draw on 
this body of OHS research, and seek to extend it by challenging the historically 
narrow paradigm that has conventionalized the har~ that workers routinely suffer. 
That is, they seek in various ways to question wpy the massive harms that workers 
endure are either not recognized as being work-related, or if work-related are not 
being recognized as disasters that require an extraordinary state response. Quinlan, 
Mayhew, and Johnstone (Chapter 2), for example, take the case of the death and 
injury of truck drivers, one of the most dangerous occupations, and inte1Togate 
why it does not attract the kind of recognition that is given to a coal-mine 
explosion that kills far fewer workers. There is, of course, the obvious point that 
truck drivers are killed one-by-one while coal miners are killed in groups when 
mines explode, but that that does not answer the question of why only clustered 
deaths tend to be socially constructed as disasters that require extraordinary 
responses. They suggest a nwnber of reasons for this, focusing especially on the 
roles of ideology and of institutions. At the ideological level, Quinlan et al. point 
to the growing influence of neo-liberalism and the emphasis it places on indi-
vidual agency, responsibility, and risk management. This facilitates a shift in 
the focus of attention onto the behavior of individual drivers, rather than on the 
underlying social causes of transport accidents that include economic pressures, 
work restructuring, and regulatory failures. By obscuring common themes that 
might be seen to link these individual events, it is less likely they will be 
aggregated and viewed as a common phenomenon that causes inunense harm-a 
disaster. They also point to the role of regulatory arrangements in the politics 
of trucking deaths. Road transport regulation, not OHS, has primary authority 
over these incidents. As a result, common work arrangements that increase the 
risk to drivers or induce riskier driver behavior have little regulatory or social 
significance. Indeed, they go largely unrecognized as health and safety officials 
who might be more attentive to such issues are unlikely to be involved. In swn, 
because truck driver deaths are individualized and not viewed through the lens 
of work, they are unlikely to be recognized as working disasters. 
The role of institutions also plays a prominent part in Hopkins' chapter, 
which considers the rise and fall of repetitive strain injury (RSI) in Australia 
during the 1980s (Chapter 3). While not suggesting that this epidemic should have 
been characterized as a disaster, Hopkins' discussion of the politics of RSI recog-
nition makes an important contribution by focusing on the process through 
which official statistics are constructed and how that data may be used to provide 
evidence of a social problem. According to Hopkins, for contingent political 
reasons the workers' compensation system was open to RSI claims at a time 
when the federal public service . was being restructured and work was being 
intensified. Because work injury statistics are derived from successful workers' 
compensation claims, this facilitated bureaucratic and social recognition of RSI 
as a real problem demanding a regulatory response. 
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Rennie's study of Newfoundland (Chapter 4) fluorspar miners' struggle to 
gain recognition that the lung diseases they suffered from were work-related also 
points to the important role that the workers' compensation system plays in the 
politics of working disasters. But in his case, its major role was to resist, not 
facilitate, recognition of the work-relatedness of the high incidence of lung 
diseases that miners suffered. Thus a major focus of Rennie's analysis is on the 
struggle of the miners, their union, and community to overcome this institutional 
and legal resistance to recognition. Rennie works from a political economy 
perspective that emphasizes the role of conflict in the politics of working disaster 
recognition. Not only did the miners have to deal with problems of scientific 
uncertainty, they also faced a government and an employer that seemed more 
concerned with the economic consequences that would ensue from acknowl-
edging that miners were becoming sick from their work than with providing 
them with proper protection and fair compensation. The combination of a growing 
body count, medical investigations, media attention, presentations to review 
committees and a royal commission, industrial action, and public protests for 
over thirty years was necessary to gain recognition of the full extent of the harm 
inflicted on the miners. 
By contrast, Thomquist's discussion of silicosis in Sweden (Chapter 5) 
shows that recognition of an occupational disease by workers' compensation 
authorities does not necessarily lead political and regulatory authorities to 
accept that continued exposure of workers to a given danger will have disastrous 
consequences unless preventive measures are taken. The central question she 
asks in her chapter is: why was there was an extended delay between the time 
silicosis was recognized as an occupational disease in 1931 and the time stricter 
controls on dust exposure were mandated? In part, the answer lies in the 
authorities' limited recognition of the scope of the problem and in their mis-
guided belief that medical supervision of exposed workers exclusively in high-risk 
work places was a sufficient response. Indeed, Thornquist argues that medical 
supervision legitimated the continued exposure of workers to silica. Conse-
quently, the struggle for recognition of silica exposure as a serious problem-
as a disaster requiring a strong state response-needed to continue. The shape 
and timing of that struggle for recognition was influenced by many factors, 
including the development of the Swedish model of industrial relations in the 
1930s (with its emphasis on . cooperative union-management self-regulation), 
the challenges to it in the 1960s and 1970s, and the activities of committed 
physicians and researchers who documented the true scope and consequences 
of worker exposure to silica. 
. These chapters also demonstrate that the politics of recognition necessarily 
join with the politics of response, if only because the nature and extent of the 
recognition of harm to workers as a disaster will influence the state's response 
to it. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the outcome of the political struggle over 
reco.gnition will not determine how the politics of response will play out. 
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Therefore, it is necessary to explore separately the processes that influence 
whether individuals or organizations will be held accountable and whether signifi-
cant change to regimes of OHS regulation will follow upon disaster recognition. 
Arguably one can identify three inter-related dimensions to the politics of 
response. First, there is likely to be a debate over causation. Victims and others 
who seek accountability and change will argue that the disaster was avoidable 
because it was the result of purposeful actions, regardless of whether the result was 
intended, whereas those who wish to avoid blame will claim both that the outcome 
was unintended and that it was the result of unguided actions (Stone 1989). 
Second, even if a disaster is identified as the outcome of purposeful behavior, there 
will still be disputes about the measures necessary to avoid similar outcomes in 
the future and whether they are practicable. Finally, even if a technical consensus 
is reached, there are likely to be political obstacles that will need to be overcome 
to implement the necessary changes. 
Although the politics of response to occupational health and safety disasters 
has received relatively little consideration, the disaster literature, especially that 
part dealing with man-made disasters, provides some useful insights. There seems 
to be widespread acceptance of two points, both of which are implicit in much of 
the discussion so far. The first is that is that the impact of disasters on public policy 
is largely determined by political processes rather than by the characteristics of the 
disasters themselves. For example, according to Freeman (2002, p. 3), "[t]he 
aftermaths of disasters are influenced less by the extent of the tragedies as by the 
political contexts in which they occur." The second is that the response to a 
disaster may produce significant changes. Thus, according to Michael Reich 
(1991): 
Disasters provide an opportunity, and sadly may even be necessary, for 
realigning the mobilization of bias and for redefining the dominant symbols in 
ways to tip the balance of power, at least momentarily, in the direction of 
public interests and in favor of the relatively powerless. Crises not only 
provide opportunities for viewing the ordinary processes of society, they also 
provide the powerless with brief chances for reforming those processes, for 
redirecting social resources in more equitable ways. (p. 266) 
The more difficult question on which there is less agreement is what factors 
shape the politics of disaster response and influence their outcomes. One focus of 
research has been on the characteristics of victims and their power resources. 
Ortwin Renn uses the metaphor of an arena to describe institutional settings in 
whi9h policy is determined and is particularly concerned with decision-making 
about risk. In his view, "[t]he fundamental axiom is that resource availability 
determines the degree of influence for shaping policies" (Renn 1992, p. 195). 
Social resources include money, power, social influence, value commitment, and 
evidence. Renn recognizes that these resources are unequally distributed, but has 
little to say on the subject. Writing about the likelihood of activism in response to 
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pain and loss events (of which disasters would be a subset), Michael Jennings 
(1999, p. 8) suggested a four-category typology generated from the combination of 
two characteristics of the affected group: their power and their social approval. 
The resulting categories are the advantaged (high on both dimensions), contenders 
(high on power, low on approval), dependents (low on power, high on approval), 
and deviants (low on both). OHS disasters will by definition have working-class 
victims and although locating them within this matrix is not entirely straight-
forward, in most cases they would be identified as a group with relatively little 
power but with reasonably high levels of approval. Jennings also suggests that 
the magnitude of the affected population and the distribution of victims will 
also be significant. While the magnitude of OHS disasters will vary, in most 
cases the distribution will be concentrated within a narrow, relatively powerless 
segment of the population. 
Because of these characteristics of the victim population in OHS disasters, it 
is especially important to inquire into the ways in which a disaster might alter the 
power and political influence that a group normally exercises. Jennings (1999, 
pp. 9-10) suggests a number of reasons why activism may be enhanced when it is 
ham1-related: the stakes are all too apparent and immediate for those whose own 
bodies have been damaged or who are close to someone who has been injured or 
killed; the propensity for people who have pain and loss experiences to join with 
others in support groups helps overcome collective action problems; the events are 
highly emotionally charged and attract media attention; and death and injury 
provide activists with an accessible stock of vivid representations that resonate 
with widely held social beliefs about compassion, justice, safety, and health. 
As these considerations suggest, OHS disasters may not only enhance the 
voice of victims, but may also help produce a more receptive environment in 
which their messages are received. Arthur McEvoy ( 199 5) addressed this 
phenomenon in his discussion of the afte1math of the Triangle Shirtwaist fire in 
1911 that killed 146 workers. One of its most important outcomes was that 
it "work[ ed) a change in the patterns of causal attribution that underlay 
public thinking about industrial safety" (p. 624). But of course disasters do 
not naturally produce shifts in common sense views, as this too is a political 
process, partially influenced by the ability of the victim group to have "[its] 
account ofreality become the reality perceived by others" (Gephart 1984, p. 213). 
McEvoy (1995, pp. 627-631) identified a number of reasons why the Triangle 
Shiltwaist fire had such a powerful social effect including: workplace accidents 
w~re already a high-profile issue at the time of the fire, in part because of debates 
about the introduction of workers' compensation legislation; the highly 
public way in which the victims died; and the fire could not be coded as an 
accident because of the obvious role of the employer in creating the hazard 
and obstructing the exits, thereby making visible how employers were 
extracting wealth from the bodies of workers (also see Bender 2004; Von Drehle 
2003). 
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While the kinds of contingent factors mentioned by McEvoy are no doubt 
important, other researchers have tried to locate more systemic influences on the 
politics of causation. Kasperson (l 992) and Renn (1992) have developed the 
concept of the social amplification of risk to explain perceptions of risk and 
risk behavior. The focus of this analytic framework is on the social processing 
of information about risks, paying particular attention to the role of groups and 
non-state institutions in either heightening or attenuating concern. The roles of 
social movements and the media, for example, have received considerable atten-
tion from these analysts. 
Of particular interest given the focus of this book are the characteristics of the 
state institutions in which the politics of response are played out. Wells (1995) 
examines the legal responses to disaster, paying particular attention to the role 
of inquiries and inquests, compensation systems, and criminal prosecution. 
While most of her book discusses specific legal issues, Wells also addresses 
particular features of the institutions in which legal redress is sought, and their 
impact on outcomes. In her discussion of corporate manslaughter prosecutions, 
for example, Wells notes the problem of institutional resistance, which she 
traces to a number of factors, some internal and others external to the criminal 
law. Thus, on the one hand, Wells notes, "[a] real tension exists between the 
paradigm of criminal culpability based on individual responsibility and the 
increasing recognition of the potential for harm inherent in large scale corporate 
activity" (p. 173). On the other hand, Wells also recognizes that the criminal 
justice system is not static and isolated from society, but rather that the social 
construction of events will shape their legal construction. As Wells (1996) noted in 
a later article, "[t]he desirability or likelihood of a prosecution for corporate 
manslaughter, following transport or other disasters caused by management 
disregard of safety policies or precautions, are not matters that can be assessed 
from a purely legal standpoint" (p. 57). 
Thus, in some ways we have come full circle. State institutions potentially 
shape the outcome of the politics of disaster but are simultaneously shaped by 
those politics as they play themselves out in non-state settings. But this should not 
be surprising given the complexity and interactive nature of legal, social, and 
political systems. Differences in approach to the politics of response, then, may lie 
more in the way researchers view social and political systems generally than in 
their view of the elements that constitute the political terrain. Thus, those who 
emphasize the salience of unequal power relations in shaping outcomes tend to 
take a more pessimistic view of the likely aftermath of a disaster. Reich (1991) 
for example concluded his study of toxic politics by observing that "[ d]isaster 
may provide the opportunity and the impetus for institutional change, allowing 
for a redistribution of power and a transformation of policy. But the existing 
distribution of power creates formidable blockages to social change that might 
benefit the relatively powerless" (p. 281 ). Gephart (1984) takes a similarly 
bleak view, noting that, "[t]he primary social change which occurs as the result 
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of [organizationally based environmental disasters] is the normalization of the 
problems of pollution and environmental degradation" (p. 222). This outcome 
is explained on the basis that capital, which benefits from certain forms of 
resource exploitation, is better able to have its view of reality accepted than that 
of those who bear and are concerned about the cost of that exploitation. Those 
who are more optimistic operate from a more pluralistic perspective, which sees 
greater opportunities for those who are relatively less powerful to influence public 
policy, in pa1t because of openings that disasters may create (e.g., McEnvoy 1995; 
Renn 1992). . 
The chapters in this book adopt a case study approach that contributes to 
these larger debates by providing rich accounts of state response to working 
disasters across a wide range of times and places. In some of these studies the 
politics of recognition and response are deeply interrelated. For example, Quinlan 
and colleagues' study of long-haul road transport in Australia demonstrates that 
the widespread and incremental nature of fatalities in that industry not only 
impedes recognition of its disastrous outcomes, but that it also undercuts the 
ability of regulators to connect these outcomes to their underlying causes related 
to economic conditions, work organization, and regulatory changes. Indeed, they 
find that truck fatalities and injuries are not even recognized as an OHS problem, 
but rather are dealt with through road transport regulation, which character-
istically focuses on individual behavior. 
Rennie's study traces the slow response of the Newfoundland government 
to the high levels of industrial disease developing among fluorspar miners in 
the mid-twentieth century. He identifies a persistent pattern of minimalism: at each 
stage of the miners' struggle for protection and compensation, the government 
diagged its feet, doing as little as was politically acceptable at the time. As a 
result, not only were many disabled workers denied compensation, but also 
excessively high dust levels persisted in the mines. To explain this phenomenon, 
Rennie adopts a political-economy-of-knowledge approach that focuses on the 
processes by which information and opinions about industrial disasters are dis-
seminated or suppressed by the parties involved. Medical recognition of the 
problem was not sufficient to generate an appropriate response and so workers 
struggled to publicize their plight, but lacked the power to trigger state action. 
Rather, incremental improvements were made almost exclusively in the afte1math 
of favorable conjunctures, including findings of public inquiries, heightened 
levels of industrial conflict, and media attention. 
Thornquist's chapter looks at a similar phenomenon involving Swedish 
workers suffering from silicosis. She also works from a political economy 
perspective that focuses on unequal power relations between workers and 
their employers. These inequalities, however, were mediated in various ways. 
Ideologically, they manifested themselves in an approach that focused on regu-
lating the worker rather than the workplace. Instead of regulating exposure, a 
matter under the control of employers, regulatory action emphasized medical 
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surveillance of workers. The regulatory response was also shaped by the broader 
labor market and industrial relations policies of the Swedish social democrats that 
relied on centralized collective bargaining by a heavily unionized workforce. It 
was only in the context of growing public awareness· of environmental hazards 
and mounting labor militancy during the 1960s and 70s that stricter controls on 
the exposure of workers to industrial dusts were introduced. 
Separating recognition and response issues is less of a problem when a large 
number of workers are killed in a single incident: these events are immediately 
coded as disasters, typically triggering some kind of public inquiry, and often 
accompanied by prosecutions and civil actions. However, this was not always the 
case. Patricia Reeves' study (Chapter 6) of the aftermath of the 1860 Pemberton 
Mill disaster in Lawrence, Massachusetts that killed over one hundred workers-
the majority women and girls-examines both the immediate response and the 
role of the disaster in reshaping popular ideas about work relations that ultimately 
led to protective legislation. There was neither a formal public inquiry nor 
legal action taken against the employers. There was, however, an effort to enact 
protective legislation, but for reasons not transparent from the historical record, 
this effort failed. Reeve speculates that in the absence of an organized movement 
of mill workers and supporters, state industrialists opposed to regulation were 
able to prevent the bill from becoming law. Yet Reeve also finds that in the longer 
run post-disaster interpretations of the events at Pemberton contributed to the 
construction of labor narratives of employer avarice and negligence, and of 
employee susceptibility to bodily harm. While on the one hand this was useful 
in the fight for protective labor laws, it simultaneously raised doubts about the 
fitness of industrial workers to participate equally in social and political life, 
precisely because of their vulnerabilities and lack of independence. 
Whyte's study of the aftermath of the Piper Alpha disaster of the British 
North Sea in 1988, which killed 167 people, also emphasizes the need to take 
a longer view of the response to disasters (Chapter 7). Here, however, the pattern 
found by Reeve was reversed. The immediate aftermath of the disaster disrupted 
the self-regulatory approach to OHS that dominated at the time. Closer monitoring 
of the scheme of self-regulation was imposed, and some costly safety controls 
were prescribed. The disruption, however, proved to be temporary. As political 
and economic conditions changed, the oil industry mounted a cost reduction 
strategy that led to a loosening of external controls as well as to work inten-
sification. OHS regulators accepted these changes notwithstanding consequent 
increases in injury rates because they accepted the oil industry's argument that 
it needed to become more "efficient" to survive. As well, their underlying 
assumption that workers and employers fundamentally have a common interest 
in safety led them to accept a return to self-regulation without strong worker 
participation rights. Whyte concludes that because of the ongoing and growing 
structural advantage enjoyed by capital, the disruption caused by the Piper Alpha 
disaster to its regulatory agenda was only temporary. 
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Tucker also takes a traditional disaster, the explosion of the Westray mine 
in Nova Scotia that killed 26 miners in 1993, and follows the politics of response 
as they played out in a variety of institutional settings. He begins by constructing 
a model of the determinants of a working disaster that incorporates interactions 
between the pre-disaster OHS regime, political-economic context, disaster charac-
teristics, and features of the institutions of redress. Like Whyte, he finds that in 
the immediate aftermath of the Westray disaster, the legitimacy of the province's 
OHS regime was struck a severe blow. Public inquiries, administrative and 
legislative reviews, criminal prosecutions, and civil litigation-all extraordinary 
responses in the OHS context-were called into play. Yet more than 12 years 
later, no individual or organization has been held legally accountable despite 
the obvious reckless disregard for workers lives by the mine operators or for the 
complete failure of OHS regulators to stop the ongoing and serious violations of 
the province's health and safety laws. A public inquiry condemned the employer 
for its neglect of safety and the government for its failure to regulate the mine, but 
it al.so endorsed the underlying health and safety model, with its emphasis on 
internal responsibility, rather than seeing it as a cause of the disaster. That finding, 
in conjunction with the relative weakness of organized labor in the province, 
allowed for the re-legitimation of the OHS regime through tinkering. 
However, the continuing public perception of Westray as an egregious 
example of corporate criminality gone unpunished, and more recent corporate 
scandals such as Enron, put the federal government under pressure to address 
perceived technical barriers to the successful prosecution of corporate offenders. 
As a result, in 2003, more than ten years after the disaster, the so-called Westray 
bill was passed, amending the Criminal Code. Overall, the Westray story demon-
strates that there may be a multiplicity of responses to a working disaster, some 
of which legitimate and reinforce pre-existing ideologies and practices, while 
others hold more promise for effecting meaningful reform and change to popular 
perceptions. 
It is much too early to assess the instrumental impact of the Westray bill, 
but experience elsewhere suggests caution. Johnstone takes up this issue in 
Chapter 8 on criminal prosecutions in Victoria, Australia. Although his study 
does not focus on disasters conventionally understood, the reality is that 
employers are almost only prosecuted when a worker is killed or seriously injured. 
Johnstone argues that each one of these events could be characterized as a disaster 
with the potential to disrupt the "membrane of normalcy" but that, paradoxically, 
prosecutions have the opposite effect of normalizing the traumatic events that 
motivate prosecutions in the first place. He explains this outcome as an effect of 
"pulverization" techniques routinely used by defense lawyers in the criminal 
process to isolate each event from its broader context, making it appear as 
something quite unique and unexpected, rather than the outcome of a systemic 
problem. As well, Johnstone points to the form of the criminal law itself that 
facilitates decontextualization and individualization through its focus on the 
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immediate event giving rise to the prosecution and its concern with individual 
wrongdoing, isolated from the underlying social relations in which that action 
is embedded. As a result, prosecutions are infrequent, and when convictions are 
secured, sentences tend to be light. According to Johnstone, the current practice 
of criminal prosecution may unwittingly serve to legitimate inadequate health 
and safety management and regulation by creating the impression that there 
are only a few bad apples in an otherwise healthy barrel. 
Finally, Dodd (Chapter 9) examines the history of public inquiries into coal 
mining disasters in Nova Scotia using the techniques of discourse analysis. She 
shares the view that disasters are potentially disruptive-that multiple deaths 
challenge people's unreflective acceptance of social and productive relations. The 
role of inquiries is to resolve these cultural coding problems by constructing a 
story or explanation of the event that convincingly explains the disaster in ways 
that reassure the reader that nothing is fundamentally wrong. But in order to 
succeed, disaster reports must draw on prior plausibility structures and follow 
literary conventions in order to establish their own legitimacy and definitiveness, 
establish chains of causation that lead elsewhere than an indictment of exploitive 
class relations, and make recommendations that if followed provide reassurance 
that future disasters can be avoided. Prior plausibility structures, however, are 
historically contingent and change over time. Dodd's investigation of the specific 
historical practice of writing inquiry reports in Nova Scotia delineates three 
periods, each dominated by a distinct narrative that, in its own way, ultimately 
reasserted the underlying harmony within the mining "community." 
Overall, these case studies are not meant to be the last word on the study 
of working disasters, but hopefully they demonstrate the richness of the field 
and will stimulate further research using a variety of methodologies and disci-
plinary approaches. 
ENDNOTES 
1. This definition and the management focus of most disaster research may explain why 
Merton and Nisbet ( 1966) chose not to include a chapter on disasters in the second 
edition of their book, Contemporary Social Problems. Fritz's essay appeared in the 
first edition (196 l ). 
2. For example, his article is not cited by any of the contributors to Quarantelli ( 1998). 
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